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While the economic theories have come to the conclusion that discounts and 
price discrimination are enhancing welfare, an obligation to offer 
non-discriminatory prices has been implemented in the sector specific regulation 
for telecom operators enjoying SMP. Moreover, price discrimination has 
generally been accepted in competition law cases. This might change in the 
future as the EU Commission has published the draft recommendation for the 
regulation of Next Generation Access networks (NGA). In this draft 
recommendation, the EU proposes to allow for the introduction of discounts 
(price discrimination) in certain cases related to Next Generation Access (NGA) 
networks on the wholesale level.   
 
This paper looks at the implications of an acceptance of price discrimination in 
the sector specific regulation of telecommunication markets. We conclude that 
price discrimination is expected to be effective in creating incentives for 
investments in NGA networks, but that there is a risk that price discrimination will 
harm competition which in turn might imply negative welfare effects. Therefore, a 
case-by-case analysis instead of a general approach is required. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
While  most  private  companies  are  using  price  discrimination,  i.e.  selling  the 
same product to different (wholesale or retail) customers at different prices, as a 
tool to maximise the producer surplus, this has in several cases been regarded 
as  problematic  for  dominant  telecommunication  operators  subject  to  ex-ante 
regulation. For these operators, the obligation of non-discrimination as set out in 
the EU Access Directive, Article 10, has in a large set of cases been imposed for 
regulated access offerings.   
 
The reason stated by the regulatory authorities is that discrimination might harm 
competition.  This  could  for  instance  be  the  case  when  discrimination  has 
negative outcomes on small operators (i.e. as in the case of volume discounts) 
and therefore might increase costs for new market entrants. 
 
In  2009,  the  EU  Commission  published  a  second  version  of  the  draft 
recommendation for the regulation of next generation access networks (NGA). 
This was updated on the 1
st of July 2010 and a final version is expected for 
autumn 2010. In this draft recommendation, the EU proposes to allow for the 
introduction of discounts (price discrimination) in certain cases related to Next 
Generation  Access  (NGA)  networks  on  the  wholesale  level.  The  aim  of  this 
change of direction in the regulation is to foster innovation and welfare growth by 
promoting investments in NGA networks. Hence, the implementation of the draft 
recommendation would imply that Article 10 of the Access Directive should not 
be applied to NGA networks or investments, which in most cases and countries 
would lead to a partial deregulation with regard to obligations. 
 
This paper looks at the implications of price discrimination and discounts for the 
promotion of efficient investments, the welfare effects and the development of 
competition  in  the  markets  for  NGA  networks.  It  looks  at  the  current  sector 
specific  regulation  for  telecommunications  and  the  implementation  of 
competition law within the EU.   
 
The research question in the paper is to identify the outcomes of the acceptance 
for price discounts and discrimination within the sector specific regulation. 
 
 
2.  SECTOR SPECIFIC REGULATION   
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the current regulation and the situation 
with respect to NGA and the change of direction regarding non-discrimination 
and price discrimination. Thereby, there are two aspects of interest. At first, the 
question is how and in what context, the EU Commission changes its approach 
towards non-discrimination obligations and price discrimination issues.         3 
 
Secondly,  the  NGA  recommendation  leads  to  the  situation  where  the  EU 
Commission explicitly recommends acceptance for price discrimination for NGA 
wholesale  offers  but  not for  wholesale  offers  in  legacy  networks.  This  might 
contradict  the  EU  framework  (and  also  the  national  implementation  in  EU 
member states) which is based on technological neutrality, implying that copper 
and fibre  infrastructures  (like fixed  and mobile  in  general)  cannot  be treated 
differently (Article 16 of Directive 2002/21/EC). This immediately leads to the 
question  whether  different  technologies  which  enable  different  (quality  of) 
services are to be seen as substitutes or not. This has an impact on how markets 
are  defined,  analysed  and  how  significant  market  power  (SMP)  is  being 
determined. 
 
In this respect two specific documents/provisions of the regulatory framework 




2.1  THE RECOMMENDATION ON NGA REGULATION 
 
According to discussions in Europe
2, the migration towards access networks 
with extended capabilities in the transmission of large bandwidths raises issues 
of strategic importance that require regulatory decisions. The EU Commission 
published a recommendation on the regulatory principles for NGA.
3 This draft 
recommendation  aims  to  set  standards  in  implementing  obligations  for  SMP 
operators (i.e. operators with significant market power or “dominant firms”) in an 
environment of NGA developments. These obligations are already defined in the 
Access  Directive
4  and  serve  as  a  toolkit.  According  to  these  measures,  the 
Commission's aim is to make these obligations future proof in the light of the 
implementation of NGA networks. Following on from these discussions, the draft 
recommendation for NGA regulation was published for consultation in autumn 
2008, and  a  revised version  was  published  on  12  June  2009.
5  That  version 
                                                 
2  Please refer to e.g. the ECTA Conference “ECTA Fibre Investment Conference 2009” in Brussels, 25.6.2009 
and  the  responses  within  the  consultation  regarding  the  EU  Commission  recommendation 
(http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/public_consult/nga_2/index_en.htm#respons
es) 
3  See  draft  recommendation  on  regulated  access  to  next  generation  access  networks 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/public_consult/nga_2/090611_nga_recom
mendation_spc.pdf 
4  See Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and 
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive). 
5  Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/public_consult/nga_2/index_en.htm# 
responses.       4 
triggered further discussions and revisions until on 1 July 2010 a final version 
was reached which was agreed between Member States and then was sent to 
the  European  Parliament.  The  report  of  the  European  Parliament  was  not 
completed upon the deadline for submitting this paper. 
 
In  the  draft  recommendation  for  NGA,  the  EC  makes  suggestions  regarding 
obligations for non-discrimination, transparency and equal access as well as 
regards tariff regulation. In particular, the basis for the tariff regulation should still 
be cost-based prices for products for which there are access obligations. The 
optimal cost base is still regarded to be incremental costs (LRIC), and the cost 
should  be  determined  for  an  efficient  operator.  New  elements  in  the 
recommendation are: 
•  Abandoning regulated national prices: The Commission in the June 2009 version 
recommended that the price for access to physical network infrastructure should 
not  be  a  geographical  average  in  the  case  of  substantial  geographical  cost 
differences, however, this part was deleted in the July 2010 version whereas the 
determination of separate geographical regional markets was maintained (this is 
also  an  effect  of  Article 8  Section 5  of  the  “better  regulation”  directive  which 
entered into fore in November 2009 with the revised EU framework); 
•  The  assessment  of  specific  risks  should  be  considered  in  the  cost  of  capital 
(WACC) determinations; and 
•  The implementation of “long-term access pricing” and volume discounts in the 
regulation. 
 
We  are  only  looking  at  the  last  element  of  these  principles  in  the  sequel. 
Regarding the implementation of long-term access pricing and volume discounts, 
these suggestions are less consistent with the idea of strict cost-based pricing 
determined  with  LRIC  as the  cost  base.
6  The  suggestions  regarding  volume 
discounts  and  lower  prices  for  wholesale  customers  that  commit  for  longer 
periods  always  bear  the  risk  of  discrimination  and  hence  a  breach  of  the 
                                                 
6  The draft recommendation even excludes cost orientation as a  method of tariff regulation in the 
following cases: (1) Multiple fibre co-investment of SMP operator with at least one further partner; (2) 
Non-exclusive project which is open to further interested parties on the same conditions; (3) All 
co-investors  have  access  to  the  jointly  established  infrastructure  on  the  same  conditions,  see 
Plückebaum, T., “EU-Entwurf einer Empfehlung über regulierten Zugang zu Next Generation Acces 
Networks (NGA), WIK Newsletter no. 76, 2009. EU-Entwurf einer Empfehlung über regulierten 
Zugang zu Next Generation Access Networks (NGA), WIK Newsletter No. 76, p. 4.: p. 5.       5 
non-discrimination obligations (Article 10 of the Access Directive).
7  To deal with 
this problem, the Commission proposes that volume discounts and long-term 
access pricing should only be allowed as long as they are reflected in reduced 
costs for the regulated operator. Financing costs can be reduced through lower 
risks associated with investments made by wholesale customers which could 





As alluded to above, discounts on the wholesale products may be in conflict with 
the  requirements  of  non-discrimination.  The  obligation  of  non-discrimination 
stems from Article 10 of the Access Directive. It is amongst the remedies that a 
national regulatory authority can levy upon operators. The main idea behind this 
remedy is that SMP operators treat all access seekers identically and thus do not 
differentiate  between  any  third  parties.  However,  the  non-discrimination 
obligation is not absolute. It refers to treat the provision of similar wholesale 
services, identical circumstances and comparable conditions. Therefore, it may 
be discussed whether the provision of wholesale offers may differ if there is a 
substantial differentiation between the access seekers e.g. with respect to the 
locations  at  which  access  is  realised,  the  volumes  of  traffic  or  the  technical 
realisation. At least it does not seem completely unreasonable to interpret the 
EU  framework  as  allowing  for  a  small  degree  of  different  conditions  as  not 
violating  the  principle  of  non-discrimination.  A  discount  –  granted  upon  the 
commitment  to  a  certain  volume  of  purchase  –  is  in  itself  such  a 
differentiation/discrimination which may, however, be justified. 
 
 
3.  COMPETITION LAW PRACTICE 
The situation in the sector specific regulation can be compared to the way price 
discrimination  is  dealt  with  according  to  competition  law.  The  comparison  is 
relevant  as  telecommunications  markets  not  regulated  according  to  sector 
specific  regulation  are  falling  under  the  competition  law  principles.  Further, 
non-discrimination is a cornerstone principle of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU).   
 
The  European  competition  law  does  not  ban  price  discrimination  in  general. 
                                                 
7  Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, 
and  interconnection  of,  electronic  communications  networks  and  associated  facilities  (Access 
Directive). 
8    The recommendation especially in the July 2010 version contains numerous interesting aspects with 
respect to when SMP operators have to make available new fibre based access products and when 
they are entitled to introduce new retail products but these aspects cannot be discussed in detail here.       6 
Competition  law  may  only  interfere  with  price  discrimination  carried  out  by 
undertakings holding a dominant market position (compared to SMP operators 
within the sector specific regulation). Dominance within competition law practice 
is a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to 
prevent  effective  competition  being  maintained  on  the  relevant  market  by 
affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, its customers and ultimately of the end consumers.
9   
 
 
3.1  ABUSIVE CONDUCT ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 102 LIT. (C) TFEU 
Ex-post  regulation  for  dominant  undertakings  is  based  on  Article  102  TFEU 
(ex-article 82 EC) which prohibits any abuse by one or more undertakings of a 
dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it. Such 
abuse may,  inter  alia,  consist  in  “applying dissimilar  conditions  to  equivalent 
transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage” (Article 102 (c) TFEU). Further, even if the conditions of Article 
102 (c) TFEU are not met, price discrimination of dominant undertakings may 
still constitute an abusive conduct according to the general ban in Article 102 
TFEU. Such an exception could e.g. be the case when not trading parties, but 
end consumers or competitors are affected.
10   
 
 
3.2  DISSIMILAR CONDITIONS 
The  wording  “dissimilar  conditions”  in  Article  102  TFEU  covers  an  unlimited 
number of trading conducts. Whether the conditions applied are dissimilar is 
assessed from the viewpoint of the party to which such conditions are applied.   
 
The  EC  Commission  and  the  European  Courts  have  applied  Article  102  (c) 
TFEU mainly to differential pricing. When it comes to price discrimination, this 
may  result  from  the  regular  pricing  policy  of  an  undertaking  or  from  the 
application of certain fidelity rebate schemes. For example, in British Airways, 
the ECJ held that applying different commission rates to travel agents according 
to  whether  or  not  they  had  achieved  their  individual  sales  objectives  by 
comparison with the reference period, was discriminatory, because the bonus 
schemes at issue entailed the application of different rates of commission to 
agents who had sold the same number of tickets.
11 
                                                 
9    ECJ, United Brands v. Commission, [1978] E.C.R. 207; COM, Discussion paper on the application of 
Article 82  of  the  Treaty  to  exclusionary  abuses,  2005, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf, no. 20. 
10    Schröter, in: von der Groeben/Schwarze. Kommentar zum EU-/EG-Vertrag, 6th edition, 2003, Art. 82 
no. 224; Möschel, in: I/M, Wettbewerbsrecht: EG, 4th edition, 2007, Art. 82 no. 255. 
11    ECJ, British Airways v. Commission, [2007] E.C.R. I-2331, para. 139.       7 
 
3.3  EQUIVALENT TRANSACTIONS 
In order to determine whether there is an equivalent transaction (as stated in 
Article 102 TFEU), it is essential to evaluate the price, nature, composition and 
quality of the products or services concerned.
12  The most common justification 
for  unequal  treatment  is  that  the  costs  of  the  products  or  services  or  the 
customers to which a certain price is charged are not subject to an equivalent 
transaction.
13  In United Brands, the ECJ expressly recognized that differences 
in  transport  costs,  taxation,  customs  duties,  the  wages  of  labor  force,  the 
conditions of marketing, the differences in the parity of currencies, or even the 




3.4  WITH OTHER TRADING PARTIES 
Article 102(c) TFEU aims at preventing upstream and downstream markets from 
anti-competitive effects. It bans the unequal treatment of “trading parties” of a 
dominant  undertaking.  Trading  parties  are  costumers  or  distributors  of  a 
dominant undertaking, but not private end consumers.   
 
The wording of Article 102 (c) TFEU indicates that the provision shall protect 
customers form being exploited by the dominant firm (so called “secondary-line” 
discrimination).  However,  the  provision  can  be  applied  equally  to  prevent 
discrimination  that  is  harmful  to  competitors  of  the  dominant  firm  (so  called 
“first-line” discrimination). For example, a dominant supplier may opt to charge 
prices below cost on a selective basis only to customers of specific competitors. 
Such behaviour may constitute an abuse in the form of predatory pricing and 
price discrimination. For example, in Hilti, the Commission held that a selective 
discriminatory pricing policy by a dominant firm designed purely to damage the 
business of, or deter market entry by, its competitors, whilst maintaining higher 
prices for the bulk of its other customers, is both exploitive of these customers 
and destructive of competition.
15   
 
 
                                                 
12    Geradin/Petit, Price Discrimination under Article 82(2) (c) EC: Clearing up the Ambiguities, Global 
Competition Law Centre, 2005, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1112254, page 16. 
13    See  for  example  COM,  Ilmailulaitos/Luftfartsverket,  [1999]  OJ  1999  L69/24,  para.  44  and  ECJ, 
AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, [1991] ECR I-3359, para. 120. 
14    ECJ, United Brands Co and United Brands v. Commission, [1978] E.C.R. 207, para. 228. 
15    COM, Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti, OJ 1988 L65/19, para. 81.       8 
3.5  COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE 
A further condition for abuse is that the trading parties in question need to be 
competitors of each other or potential competitors.
16  Otherwise a trading party 
may not suffer a “competitive disadvantage” from the discriminatory conduct of a 
dominant undertaking. Phrased differently, the competitive disadvantage of one 
trading party is likely to result from the fact that another trading party benefits 





3.6  RELEVANCE FOR NGA MARKETS 
By looking at the markets for NGA and price discrimination, one can conclude 
that  these  are  susceptible  for  market  abuse  according  to  competition  law  if 
certain pricing schemes are implemented by firms gaining a dominant position in 
certain situations. This is the case because many telecommunication operators 
with market dominance are integrated operators offering both wholesale and 
retail offers. Price discrimination will therefore be negotiated between trading 
parties which are in several cases also competitors. If the price discrimination is 
to  be  seen  as  dissimilar  prices  to  different  trading  partners  for  equivalent 
transactions and it is practiced by a dominant firm, it would constitute an abuse 
according to Article 102 TFEU. 
 
 
4.  PRICE DISCRIMINATION FROM AN ECONOMIC POINT OF 
VIEW 
In this section, we assess the microeconomic theories on price discrimination, 
emphasising on the outcomes on total welfare, consumer welfare and market 
concentration/competition.  Thereby  the  specific  characteristics  of  the  tele-
communications  industry  with  high  CAPEX  and  a  large  difference  between 
marginal and long-run incremental costs play an important role.   
 
 
4.1  DEFINITION AND TYPES OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
The common definition of price discrimination is “the practice of selling the same 
product to different customers at different prices even though the cost of sale is 
the same to each of them. More precisely, it is selling at a price or prices such 
                                                 
16    COM, GVL, [1981] OJ 1981 L370/49, para. 51. 
17    See for example ECJ, Irish Sugar plc v. Commission, [1999] ECR II-2969.       9 
that the ratio of price to marginal costs is different in different sales”.
18   
 
There are different forms of price discrimination. Bouckaert et al. describe the 
three typical degrees of price discrimination:
19 
•  First Degree: The supplier is able to perfectly discriminate across its customers 
and the price set equals the maximum each customer is willing to pay. In this case, 
the supplier succeeds to capture the entire consumer surplus. This is according to 
most studies unrealistic, as it requires that the supplier has full information about its 
customers. 
•  Second degree: The supplier sets a price which varies with the number of units 
purchased by the customer, i.e. volume discounts and bonus payments. 
•  Third  degree: The  price  discrimination takes  place  when  the  supplier  charges 
different prices to different groups of customers depending on their elasticity of 
demand. This is also referred to as Ramsey pricing. 
In the case of the regulation of NGA, the EU Commission explicitly recommends 
the  acceptance  of  volume  discounts,  hence  the  second  degree  of  price 
discrimination. The EU Commission also recommends that suppliers would be 
able to provide discounts to wholesale customers which commit themselves for a 
longer  period  in  time.  This  can  be  seen  as  a  type  of  the  second  degree  of 
discrimination (a discount for large purchases) or as a method to differentiate the 
customers according to their willingness to pay, which would be the third degree 
of discrimination.   
 
In  order  to  avoid  conflicts  with  the  cost  orientation  obligations  and  the 
non-discrimination obligations, the EU Commission states that these must be 
appropriate. Ruhle and Lundborg conclude that “to deal with this problem, the 
Commission  proposes  that  volume  discounts  and  long-term  access  pricing 
should only be allowed as they reduce costs, i.e. financing costs can be reduced 
though lower risks associated with investments made by wholesale customers, 
which could motivate price differentiation without violating the principle of LRIC 
pricing”.
20  In the same paper Ruhle and Lundborg show that the cost differences 
                                                 
18    Posner, R. “Antitrust Law”, Second Edition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2001, 
p. 79-80 
19    Bouckhaert J., Degryse H., van Dijk T., “Price Discrimination Bans on Dominant Firms”, CESifo 
Working Paper No. 2192, January 2008, p. 5 
20    Ruhle E-O., Lundborg M., “EU Policy for next generation access – an innovative or incremental step 
forward?”, Telecommunications Policy 34, 2010, p. 40       10 
for  NGA  investments  based  on  the  shift  in  risks  from  the  supplier  to  the 
wholesale customer leaves a very small room for differentiation in prices.   
 
 
4.2  WELFARE EFFECTS 
The  results  of  the  academic  research  so  far  are  that  price  discrimination 
increases the producer surplus while the outcomes on the consumer surplus and 
the overall welfare are heterogeneous. It is hard to say, a priori, whether a given 
form of price discrimination increases or decreases welfare. The welfare effects 
of  discriminatory  prices  generally  depend  on  factual  issues,  such  as  if  it 
increases  total  output.
21  This  is  e.g.  the  case  when  discounts  for  some 
customers enable these customers to buy the product although they would not 
be  able  or  willing  to  buy  the  product  at  an  average  price  paid  by  other 
customers.
22   
 
Varian found already in 1985 that a necessary condition for price discrimination 
to  improve  welfare  is  that  output  increases.
23  Since  then  though  there  are 
findings when assessing input pricing (as the case for NGA investments and 
regulation) showing that in certain situations, welfare increases only when output 
falls.
24  This is especially the case, when the supplier is a vertically integrated 
firm or in case of input prices (“wholesale prices”). Valetti demonstrated in 2003 
that  input  price  discrimination  can  be  detrimental  both  in  terms  of  a  lower 
consumer surplus and lower total welfare even if the upstream monopolist has 
no incentive to favour a particular downstream firm.
25   
 
Also Geradin and Petit come to the conclusion that there can be negative effects 
from price discrimination. A negative outcome can be the result if the only effect 
of price discrimination is that the market shares are reallocated between the 
existing  market  participants.  In  these  cases,  the  welfare  effects  might  be 
negative as operators are forced out of the market (cnf. “predatory pricing”).
26 
 
                                                 
21    Geradin D., Petit N., “Price Discrimination under EC Competition Law: The need for a case-by-case 
Approach”, GCLC Working paper 07/05, 2007, p. 2 
22    Geradin D., Petit N., “Price Discrimination under EC Competition Law: The need for a case-by-case 
Approach”, GCLC Working paper 07/05, 2007, p. 6 
23    Varian H., “Price discrimination and social welfare”, American Economic Review, 75, 870-975, 1985   
24    Valetti T,. “Input price discrimination with downstream Cournot competitors”, International Journal 
of Industrial Organisation, 21, 969-988, 2003 AND Yoshida, Y. “Third degree price discrimination in 
input markets: output and welfare”, American Economic Review, 90: 240-246, 2000   
25    Valetti T,. “Input price discrimination with downstream Cournot competitors”, International Journal 
of Industrial Organisation, 21, 969-988, 2003 
26    Geradin D., Petit N., “Price Discrimination under EC Competition Law: The need for a case-by-case 
Approach”, GCLC Working paper 07/05, 2007, p. 6       11 
It  is  interesting  for  the  telecommunications  industry  and  especially  the  NGA 
markets, where the fixed costs are making up a large fraction of the total costs, 
that welfare effects from price discrimination are especially positive in industries 
where  the  supplier  has  declining  average  costs.  Price  discrimination  allows 
suppliers  with  a  high  proportion  of fixed  costs  to  expand  their  output  with  a 
positive marginal return on capital to a great extent as the marginal costs are 
very low. In this case, every additional customer will have a positive contribution 
to  the  common  and  fixed  costs.  Prohibiting  price  discrimination  would  thus 
prevent  efficient  recovery  of  fixed  costs  and  would,  in  the  long  run,  have  a 
negative impact on investments.
27 
 
The conclusions to be drawn from this research are that a generally accepted method 
to evaluate the welfare effects is to measure the total output. In most cases in the 
telecommunications industry, with a high proportion of fixed costs, the marginal costs 
are  low  and  the  outcomes  on  welfare  and  investments  are  especially  positive. 
Contradictory to these findings, the welfare effects can be negative in case of input 
prices, which is the case for the wholesale regulation of NGA markets. In case of 
non-vertically integrated NGA operators, price discrimination might have a positive 
impact on welfare and investments but in case of vertically integrated operators, the 
outcomes from price discrimination is difficult to determine and must be assessed on 
a case-by-case basis.   
 
 
5.  PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND NGA 
 
5.1  TECHNOCLOGICAL CHANGE THROUGH NGA DEVELOPMENTS 
Developments towards NGA pose new challenges for regulation. The reasons 
are to be found in the changes in the technical and commercial environment. 
NGA  are  established  in  a  different  environment.  Whereas  Current  Access 
Generation (CGA) to the largest extent is based on copper infrastructure which 
has been deployed decades ago under a monopolistic regime for which access 
obligations seemed very appropriate, NGA is being deployed in a competitive 
setting. This leads to a different commercial assessment.   
 
Furthermore, NGA offers a variety of possibilities with respect to the realisation 
and the interplay between fibre and copper networks, e.g. FttC, FttB and FttH. All 
of these variations imply a discussion about the existence of significant market 
power, the delineation between core and access networks and the question of 
cost  standards  and  pricing  that  shall  apply.  This  also  touches  upon  the 
consistency of prices compared to existing wholesale products (from the CGA 
                                                 
27    Geradin D., Petit N., “Price Discrimination under EC Competition Law: The need for a case-by-case 
Approach”, GCLC Working paper 07/05, 2007, p. 6       12 
environment).  Especially  the  delineation  between  core  and  access  network 
leads to a revision of the classical demarcation point between that part of the 
infrastructure  that  is  individual  for  each  customer  and  where  infrastructure 
elements are bundled to serve a group of customers. This again has an impact 
on  the  wholesale  products  which  may  be  offered  (voluntarily  or  based  on 
regulation),  i.e.  whether  and  how  unbundling  and  bitstream  access  are 
technically realised in an NGA environment. The technical demarcations and 
differentiations determine the extent of the provision of services along the value 




5.2  PRICE DISCRIMINATION, INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND NGA INVESTMENTS 
In the area of regulation, there has been an ongoing discussion on the outcomes 
of  regulation,  especially  with  regard  to  investment  incentives.  According  to 
several  studies,  the  alternative  to  remove  or  lighten  the  regulation  would 
increase  the  investment  incentives  as  it  allows  above-normal  profit.
29  Jorde, 
Sidak and Teece have concluded that ex-ante regulation of network elements 
(through mandatory unbundling on a cost oriented basis) reduces investment by 
incumbents both in maintaining and improving networks. They further state that 
the  regulation  delays  investments  by  competitors  as  those  can  rely  on  the 
infrastructure of the incumbent.
30  De Bijl and Peitz argue that wholesale access 
regulation may no longer be appropriate in the light of the outcomes of regulation 
on investment incentives.
31   
 
On the other hand, as long as there is a competition problem in the wholesale 
access  markets  one  can  argue  that  the  dominant  operator  will  leverage  its 
market power to competitive downstream markets, which will reduce the overall 
welfare.
32   
 
An  interesting  experience  on  the  further  deregulation  is  provided  by  the  US 
during the last decade. The regulatory authority has withdrawn nearly all access 
obligations  including  the  obligations  for  fibre  access  networks.  Among  the 
                                                 
28    Cnf to Lundborg M., “Lessons learned from the regulation of LLU for the future regulation of NGA 
networks”, In: Promoting New telecom infrastructures – markets, policies, and pricing, Ed. Marklund 
J., 2010 (Forthcoming)   
29    See e.g. Gans J. and S. King „Access holidays for network infrastructure investment”, Agenda, Vol. 
10/2, pp 163-178   
30    Jorde T.M., Sidak J.G. and Teece D.J. “Innovation investment and unbundling”, Yale Journal on 
Regulation, vol. 17, pp. 1-37   
31    De Bijl P.W. and M. Peitz “Innovation, convergence and the role of regulation in the Netherlands and 
beyond”. TILEC Discussion paper No. 2007-016, 2007   
32    Kirch F. und C. von Hirchhausen „Regulation of NGN: Structural separation, access regulation, or No 
regulation at all?“, Communications&Strategies, No.69, 1st Quarter 2008         13 
withdrawn obligation is the one for shared access of the local loop. The only 
remaining  remedy  relevant for  broadband access  is LLU. The  conclusion  by 
Marcus and Elixmann on the outcomes of this deregulation is that the markets 
have  developed  in  a  series  of  non-geographically  overlapping  duopolies  of 




“The U.S. has seen strong investments in fibre access by incumbents, and 
steady  improvements  in  cable  plant,  but  negligible  investments  (or 
disinvestments) on the part of competitors. Broadband penetration and the 
price/performance of offers are reasonable, but probably nowhere near what 
might have been expected given the ubiquity of cable television and the 
enormous head start that the U.S. once had.” 
 
According to the changes brought about by NGA, there is not much speaking for 
a change to the current competition situation with a limited number of access 
networks  (normally  one  incumbent  network  and  at  best  an  additional  CATV 
network) and dominant operators as a consequence. First, the infrastructures 
remain subject to significant economies of scale as their development requires 
large, sunk investments. Second, property owners will likely not allow operators 
to duplicate the last network section on the premise/indoors. Hence, it is unlikely 
that there will be additional parallel networks in the future.
34 
 
Based  on  the  discussion  and  findings  on  the  (thought)  positive  impact  of 
deregulation  on  investments  and  the mixed  empirical  results  in  the  US,  it  is 
difficult  to  draw  any  clear  cut  conclusions  on  the  optimal  regulatory  option. 
Rather, there is a trade-off between investment incentives and the safeguarding 
of competition.
35   
 
With regard to NGA, where investment incentives are of high importance in order 
to enable and foster the technological development towards higher bandwidth 
access networks, a deregulation for new networks becomes more interesting. 
On  the  other hand,  if  the  deregulation  enables  the  SMP operators  to derive 
monopoly or oligopoly gains for their existing networks, the risks are immense 
that  the  SMP operator  chooses  not  to  invest  in  NGA  networks  and  that  the 
deregulation leads to increasing competition problems. Hence, the deregulation 
might only be allowed for revenues derived from NGA networks and the way it is 
implemented must not have any overspill effects to the markets based on legacy 
                                                 
33    Marcus  J.S.  and  D.  Elixmann  „Regulatory  approaches  to  NGNs:  an  international  comparison“, 
Communications&Strategies No. 9, 1st Quarter 2008 , p. 34 
34    F. Kirch und von Hirchhausen C., 2008, p. 68. See also Marcus J.S. and D. Elixmann, 2008, p. 23 
35    See also Lundborg M., “Lessons learned from the regulation of LLU for the future regulation of NGA 
networks”, In: Promoting New telecom infrastructures – markets, policies, and pricing, Ed. Marklund 
J., 2010 (Forthcoming)         14 
networks.   
 
In  the  light  of  this,  the  proposal  by  the EU  Commission  to  keep  the  current 
regulation,  but  to  enable  volume  discounts  and  lower  prices  for  operators 
committing themselves over time for the purchase of NGA wholesale offers, is 
promising, as it limits the deregulation to NGA investments, but still enables 
SMP  operators  to  increase  the  producer  surplus,  which  leads  to  increased 
incentives to invest.   
 
 
5.3  RELEVANCE OF VOLUME DISCOUNTS AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
If the regulatory authorities decide to deregulate the NGA markets “too much”, 
there is a risk that the NGA markets become monopoly markets just as in case of 
the legacy networks. This might force the authorities to change their strategy 
later on and to impose more regulation in a later stage, when the damage with 
regard  to  the  competition  situation  is  already  done.  Based  on  the  NGA 
recommendation  of  the  EU  Commission,  this  problem  is  overcome  by  only 
recommending less regulation allowing for price discrimination to a limited extent, 
but to keep all the regulatory obligations as a tool to handle the competition 
problems.   
 
In its recommendation on NGA regulation, the Commission limits its suggestions 
for price discrimination by only recommending volume discounts and discounts 
for long-term commitment and by stating that the discrimination must only be 
allowed to the extent, to which the costs are reduced. On strictly terms, this does 
not even fall under the definition of price discrimination. 
 
Ruhle  and  Lundborg
36   have  assessed  the  outcomes  of  the  NGA 
recommendation,  including  the  outcome  of  the  limitations  to  the  price 
discrimination set by the Commission. Thereby they conclude that the main cost 
reductions for the SMP operator are derived from the shift in risks from the SMP 
operator to its wholesale customers. In case of investments in NGA, the largest 
risk is that the penetration rates do not take up. As the SMP operator still bears 
the largest part of this risk, the change in costs are low with the effects, that the 
allowed discounts will be to small to have an effect on the investment incentives. 
 
Another problem identified by Ruhle and Lundborg
37  which might motivate the 
regulatory authorities to only accept small discounts is a different outcome for 
different operators. It is likely that new entrants or niche operators will be less 
able to commit themselves to large volumes and also for longer contract periods, 
                                                 
36    Ruhle E-O., Lundborg M., “EU Policy for next generation access – an innovative or incremental step 
forward?”, Telecommunications Policy 34 (2010). Pp. 36-44   
37    Ibid.       15 
because a loss for a small operator or market entrant can only be covered by a 
small number of existing customers or no existing customers at all. In certain 
cases the allowed price discrimination (especially in case of volume discounts) 
will prevent market entry and limit competition by establishing markets with only 
a  few  operators.  Hence,  it  is  possible  that  the  implementation  of  volume 
discounts  and  long-term  price  differentiation  will  promote  single  or  joint 
dominance. For regulatory authorities this means that they will have to strike a 
balance between possible investment incentives on one hand, and the negative 
outcomes of less competition on the other. As the markets for NGA networks still 
has to emerge in most regions of Europe, and it is likely that only one NGA 
access operator will exist in each region, the regulatory acceptance of price 
discrimination in order to facilitate investment incentives might be an optimal 
solution.   
 
 
6.  CONCLUDING DISCUSSION   
The EU Commission regards the acceptance of price discrimination to a certain 
extent, in order to incentivise investments in NGA networks. In its suggestion 
though, it limits the extent to what is justifiable. 
 
By looking at the competition law practice, price discrimination is per se allowed, 
even for SMP operators. Although, under certain circumstances as in case of 
vertical integrated SMP operators discriminating one or some of its wholesale 
customers, price discrimination can be prohibited if it is indirectly harmful for 
consumers.  Hence,  in  principle  the  competition  law  allows  for  price 
discrimination but makes some exceptions. This means in comparison to the 
suggestion of the EU Commission within the sector specific regulation, that the 
latter is still more prohibitive than the competition law practice. 
 
The scientific findings regarding price discrimination is, that generally the welfare 
effects are increased, but this is not the case under all circumstances. Negative 
welfare effects might sometimes be the outcome in cases when the dominant 
firm is a vertical integrated operator competing with its own wholesale customers 
in the retail markets. As this is normally the case for wholesale NGA markets, 
this means that the cautious approach by the EU Commission, to only allow for 
price discrimination to a certain extent, is justifiable from an economic point of 
view.   
 
It is questionable though if enough investment incentives are created in order to 
promote investments in NGA networks with such an approach. Due to the large 
extent of fixed costs for NGA networks, price discrimination is to be seen as an 
effective tool to increase investment incentives. Based on the experience that 
the NGA infrastructures tend to be bottlenecks, and the markets will experience       16 
competition problems anyway, one could assume that the recommendation of 
the Commission would have increased the welfare to a higher extent if more 
price discrimination had been allowed for. 
 
For authorities responsible for sector specific regulation of telecommunication 
markets,  a  balance  in  the  trade-off  between  investment  incentives  for  NGA 
networks and the establishment of competition (and thereby dynamic effects 
implied  by  competition)  has  to  be  struck.  As  an  overall  conclusion,  a 
case-by-case analysis, as implemented by the European Regulatory Framework 
for sector specific regulation, is the best approach to balance the trade-off by 
integrating  a  large number  of  situation  specific  conditions  into  the  regulatory 
decisions. The difficulty to choose the right approach can already be seen from 
the long-lasting discussion about regulatory holidays (i.e. the forbearance from 
regulatory  involvement)  as  well  as  the  debate  about  the  consideration  of  a 
risk-adjusted WACC for investment into NGA. Also these aspects are a facet of 
dealing with the economic changes resulting from NGA developments. 
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